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Abstract—In this paper, we consider transmitter optimization
in multiple-input single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with
common and secret messages. The secret message is intended for
K users and it is transmitted with perfect secrecy with respect to
J eavesdroppers which are also assumed to be legitimate users
in the network. The common message is transmitted at a fixed
rate R0 and it is intended for all K users and J eavesdroppers.
The source operates under a total power constraint. It also
injects artificial noise to improve the secrecy rate. We obtain
the optimum covariance matrices associated with the common
message, secret message, and artificial noise, which maximize
the achievable secrecy rate and simultaneously meet the fixed
rate R0 for the common message.
keywords: Physical layer security, MISO, common and secret messages,
secrecy rate, artificial noise, multiple eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of achieving perfect secrecy using physical
layer techniques was first introduced in [1] on a degraded
wiretap channel. Later, this work was extended to more general
broadcast channel and Gaussian channel in [2] and [3], re-
spectively. Achieving secrecy using physical layer techniques
as opposed to cryptographic techniques does not rely on
the computational limitation of the eavesdroppers. Wireless
networks can be easily eavesdropped due to the broadcast
nature of the information transmission. With the growing
applications on wireless networks, there is a growing demand
for achieving secrecy on these networks. Secrecy in multi-
antenna point-to-point wireless links has been studied by
several authors, e.g., [4]–[8]. In [2], simultaneous transmission
of a private message to receiver 1 at rate R1 and a common
message to receivers 1 and 2 at rate R0 for two discrete
memoryless channels with common input was considered.
Recently, the work in [2] has been extended to multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) broadcast channel with confidential
and common messages in [9]–[11]. Motivated by the above
works, in this paper, we consider transmitter optimization in
multiple-input single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with
common and secret messages. The secret message is intended
for K users and it is transmitted with perfect secrecy with
respect to J eavesdroppers which are also assumed to be
legitimate users in the network. The common message is
transmitted at a fixed rate R0 and it is intended for all
K users and J eavesdroppers. The source operates under
a total power constraint. It also injects artificial noise to
improve the secrecy rate. Under these settings, we obtain
the optimum covariance matrices associated with the common
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Fig. 1. System model for MISO broadcast channel with common and secret
messages.
message, secret message, and artificial noise, which maximize
the achievable secrecy rate and simultaneously meet the fixed
rate R0 for the common message. We note that the secrecy rate
maximization in MISO channel without common message and
in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers has been considered
in [12] where the secret message is intended only for a single
user (i.e., K = 1).
Notations : A ∈ CN1×N2 implies that A is a complex
matrix of dimension N1 × N2. A  0 implies that A is
a positive semidefinite matrix. Complex conjugate transpose
operation is denoted by [.]∗. E[.] denotes the expectation
operator, and ‖ . ‖ denotes the 2-norm operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a MISO broadcast channel as shown in Fig. 1
which consists of a source S having N transmit antennas, K
users {D1, D2, · · · , DK} each having single antenna, and J
eavesdroppers {E1, E2, · · · , EJ} each having single antenna.
The complex channel gain from S to Dk is denoted by hk ∈
C1×N , 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Likewise, the complex channel gain from
S to Ej is denoted by zj ∈ C1×N , 1 ≤ j ≤ J . We assume
that eavesdroppers are non-colluding [8].
Let PT denote the total transmit power budget in the system,
i.e., the source S operates under total power constraint PT . The
communication between the source and the users and eaves-
droppers happens in n channel uses. The source S transmits
two independent messages W0 and W1, which are equiproba-
ble over {1, 2, · · · , 2nR0} and {1, 2, · · · , 2nR1}, respectively.
W0 is the common message to be conveyed to all Dks and Ejs
at information rate R0. W1 is the secret message which has to
be conveyed to all Dks at some rate R1 with perfect secrecy
with respect to all Ejs [8]. For each W0 drawn equiprobably
from the set {1, 2, · · · , 2nR0}, the source maps W0 to an
i.i.d. (∼ CN (0,Q
0
)) codeword {X0i }ni=1 of length n, where
each X0i ∈ CN×1 and Q0 = E[X0iX0∗i ]. Similarly, for
each W1 drawn equiprobably from the set {1, 2, · · · , 2nR1},
the source, using a stochastic encoder, maps W1 to an i.i.d.
(∼ CN (0,Q
1
)) codeword {X1i }ni=1 of length n, where each
X1i ∈ C
N×1 and Q
1
= E[X1iX
1∗
i ]. The source also injects
i.i.d. (∼ CN (0,Q
2
)) artificial noise sequence {X2i }ni=1 of
length n, where each X2i ∈ CN×1 and Q2 = E[X2iX2∗i ]. In
the ith channel use, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the source transmits the sum
of the symbols which is X0i +X1i +X2i . Since the source is
power limited, this implies that
trace(Q
0
) + trace(Q
1
) + trace(Q
2
) ≤ PT . (1)
In the following, we will use X0, X1 and X2 to denote
the symbols in the codewords {X0i }ni=1 and {X
1
i }
n
i=1, and
the artificial noise sequence {X2i }ni=1, respectively. We also
assume that all the channel gains are known and remain static
over the codeword transmit duration. Let yDk and yEj denote
the received signals at Dk and Ej , respectively. We have
yDk = hkX
0 + hkX
1 + hkX
2 + ηDk ,
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, (2)
yEj = zjX
0 + zjX
1 + zjX
2 + ηEj ,
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, (3)
where the ηs are the noise components, assumed to be i.i.d.
CN (0, N0).
III. TRANSMITTER OPTIMIZATION IN MISO BROADCAST
CHANNEL
Since the symbol X0 is transmitted at information rate R0
irrespective of X1, treating X1 as noise in (2), Dks will be
able to decode X0 if ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K,
I
(
X0; yDk
)
= log
2
(
1 +
hkQ0h
∗
k
N0 + hkQ1h
∗
k + hkQ2h
∗
k
)
≥ R0. (4)
Similarly, treating X1 as noise in (3), Ejs will be able to
decode X0 if ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
I
(
X0; yEj
)
= log
2
(
1 +
zjQ0z
∗
j
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j + zjQ2z
∗
j
)
≥ R0. (5)
Using (2) and with the knowledge of the symbol X0, the
information rate for X1 at Dk is
I
(
X1; yDk | X
0
)
= log
2
(
1 +
hkQ1h
∗
k
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k
)
. (6)
Similarly, using (3) and with the knowledge of X0, the
information rate for X1 at Ej is
I
(
X1; yEj |X
0
)
= log
2
(
1 +
zjQ1z
∗
j
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j
)
. (7)
A. Transmitter optimization - without artificial noise
In this subsection, we consider transmitter optimization in
MISO broadcast channel when no artificial noise is injected
by the source. Subject to the constraints in (1), (4) and (5),
the achievable secrecy rate for X1 is obtained by solving the
following optimization problem [8]:
R1 = max
Q
0
, Q
1
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J{
I
(
X1; yDk |X
0
)
− I
(
X1; yEj |X
0
)} (8)
= max
Q
0
, Q
1
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J
log
2
(1 + hkQ1h∗k
N0
1 +
zjQ1z
∗
j
N0
)
(9)
= log
2
max
Q
0
, Q
1
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J
(N0 + hkQ1h∗k
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
(10)
s.t.
log
2
(
1 +
hkQ0h
∗
k
N0 + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≥ R0, ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, (11)
log
2
(
1 +
zjQ0z
∗
j
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
≥ R0, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, (12)
Q
0
 0, Q
1
 0, trace(Q
0
) + trace(Q
1
) ≤ PT . (13)
The constraints (11) and (12) are obtained from (4) and (5),
respectively. The objective function in (8) is obtained from (6)
and (7). We rewrite the optimization problem in (10) in the
following equivalent form:
max
Q
0
, Q
1
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J
(N0 + hkQ1h∗k
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
(14)
s.t. (
1 +
hkQ0h
∗
k
N0 + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≥ 2R0 , ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K,
(
1 +
zjQ0z
∗
j
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
≥ 2R0 , ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
Q
0
 0, Q
1
 0, trace(Q
0
) + trace(Q
1
) ≤ PT . (15)
Further, we rewrite the innermost minimization in (14),
namely,
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J
(
N0 + hkQ1h
∗
k
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
, (16)
in the following equivalent maximization form:
max
t
t (17)
s.t. t
(
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
−
(
N0 + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J. (18)
Substituting the above maximization form in (14), we get the
following single maximization form:
max
Q
0
, Q
1
, t
t (19)
s.t. ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
t
(
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
−
(
N0 + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,(
2R0 − 1
)(
N0 + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
−
(
hkQ0h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,(
2R0 − 1
)(
N0 + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
−
(
zjQ0z
∗
j
)
≤ 0,
Q
0
 0, Q
1
 0, trace(Q
0
) + trace(Q
1
) ≤ PT . (20)
For a given t, the above problem is formulated as the following
semidefinite feasibility problem [13]:
find Q
0
, Q
1
, (21)
subject to the constraints in (20). The maximum value of t,
denoted by tmax, can be obtained using bisection method as
follows. Let tmax lie in the interval [tll, tul]. The value of tll
can be taken as 1 (corresponding to the minimum secrecy rate
of 0) and tul can be taken as (1 + mink=1,2,··· ,K PT ‖hk‖
2
N0
),
which corresponds to the minimum information capacity
among Dks when the entire power PT is allotted to the source
S. Check the feasibility of (20) at t = (tll+tul)/2. If feasible,
then tll = t, else tul = t. Repeat this until tul−tll ≤ ζ, where
ζ is a small positive number. Using tmax in (10), the secrecy
rate is given by
R1 = log2 tmax. (22)
Remark: We note that the maximum common message
information rate, Rmax
0
, can be obtained as follows:
Rmax
0
= max
Q
0
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,j
{
I
(
X0; yDk
)
, I
(
X0; yEj
)} (23)
s.t. Q
0
 0, trace(Q
0
) ≤ PT , (24)
where I
(
X0; yDk
)
and I
(
X0; yEj
)
in (23) are obtained
from (4) and (5), respectively, with Q
1
= Q
2
= 0. The
above optimization problem can be easily solved using the
method as proposed above to solve (10). Also, using the K.K.T
conditions, it can be shown that Rmax
0
attains its maximum
value when trace(Q
0
) = PT , i.e., when all the available
power is used. This implies that for R1 > 0, R0 < Rmax0 .
B. Rank-1 approximation of Q
1
and Q
0
- without artificial
noise
The optimal solutions Q
0
and Q
1
obtained from (19) may
or may not have rank 1. This can be easily seen from the K.K.T
conditions of the optimization problem (19). For practical
application, a rank-1 approximation of Q
0
and Q
1
can be
done as follows. Let φ0 ∈ CN×1 and φ1 ∈ CN×1 be
the unit norm eigen directions of Q
0
and Q
1
corresponding
to the largest eigen values, respectively. We take P0φ0φ0∗
and P1φ1φ1∗ as the rank-1 approximation of Q0 and Q1,
respectively, where P0 ≥ 0, P1 ≥ 0 and P0 + P1 ≤ PT .
We substitute Q
0
= P0φ
0φ0∗ and Q
1
= P1φ
1φ1∗ in the
optimization problem (19), which results in the following
optimization problem:
max
P0, P1, t
t (25)
s.t. ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
t
(
N0 + P1zjφ
1
φ
1∗
z
∗
j
)
−
(
N0 + P1hkφ
1
φ
1∗
h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,(
2
R0 − 1
)(
N0 + P1hkφ
1
φ
1∗
h
∗
k
)
−
(
P0hkφ
0
φ
0∗
h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,(
2
R0 − 1
)(
N0 + P1zjφ
1
φ
1∗
z
∗
j
)
−
(
P0zjP0φ
0
φ
0∗
z
∗
j
)
≤ 0,
P0 ≥ 0, P1 ≥ 0, P0 + P1 ≤ PT . (26)
For a given t, the above problem is formulated as the following
linear feasibility problem:
find P0, P1, (27)
subject to the constraints in (26). The maximum value of t can
be obtained using the bisection method and the corresponding
secrecy rate can be obtained using (22).
C. Transmitter optimization - with artificial noise
In this subsection, we consider transmitter optimization in
MISO broadcast channel when artificial noise is injected by
the source. Subject to the constraints in (1), (4) and (5), the
achievable secrecy rate for X1 is obtained by solving the
following optimization problem:
R1 = max
Q0, Q1, Q2
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J{
I
(
X
1
; yDk |X
0
)
− I
(
X
1
; yEj |X
0
)} (28)
= max
Q0, Q1, Q2
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J
log2
(1 + hkQ1h∗k
N0+hkQ2h
∗
k
1 +
zjQ1z
∗
j
N0+zjQ2z
∗
j
)
(29)
= log2 max
Q0, Q1, Q2
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J(
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k + hkQ1h
∗
k
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k
)( N0 + zjQ2z∗j
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
(30)
s.t.
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
log
2
(
1 +
hkQ0h
∗
k
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≥ R0, (31)
log
2
(
1 +
zjQ0z
∗
j
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
≥ R0, (32)
Q
0
 0, Q
1
 0, Q
2
 0,
trace(Q
0
) + trace(Q
1
) + trace(Q
2
) ≤ PT , (33)
where the constraints (31) and (32) are obtained from (4) and
(5), respectively, and the objective function in (28) is obtained
from (6) and (7). We rewrite the optimization problem in (30)
in the following equivalent form:
max
Q
0
, Q
1
, Q
2
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J
(N0 + hkQ2h∗k + hkQ1h∗k
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k
)
( N0 + zjQ2z∗j
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
(34)
s.t. ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,(
1 +
hkQ0h
∗
k
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≥ 2R0 ,
(
1 +
zjQ0z
∗
j
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
≥ 2R0 ,
Q
0
 0, Q
1
 0, Q
2
 0,
trace(Q
0
) + trace(Q
1
) + trace(Q
2
) ≤ PT . (35)
Further, we rewrite the innermost minimization in (34),
namely,
min
k=1,2,··· ,K
j=1,2,··· ,J
(N0 + hkQ2h∗k + hkQ1h∗k
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k
)
( N0 + zjQ2z∗j
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
, (36)
in the following equivalent maximization form:
max
u, v
uv (37)
s.t. ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
u
(
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k
)
−
(
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,
v
(
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
−
(
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j
)
≤ 0. (38)
Substituting the above maximization form in (34), we get the
following single maximization form:
max
Q
0
, Q
1
, Q
2
, u, v
uv (39)
s.t. ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,(
2R0 − 1
)(
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
−
(
hkQ0h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,(
2R0 − 1
)(
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
−
(
zjQ0z
∗
j
)
≤ 0,
u
(
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k
)
−
(
N0 + hkQ2h
∗
k + hkQ1h
∗
k
)
≤ 0,
v
(
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j + zjQ1z
∗
j
)
−
(
N0 + zjQ2z
∗
j
)
≤ 0,
Q
0
 0, Q
1
 0, Q
2
 0,
trace(Q
0
) + trace(Q
1
) + trace(Q
2
) ≤ PT . (40)
From the constraints in (40), it is obvious that the upper
bound for u can be taken as
(
1 + mink=1,2,··· ,K
PT ‖hk‖
2
N0
)
and
we denote it by umax. Similarly, the upper bound for v can
be taken as 1 and we denote it by vmax. We denote the
optimum value of the optimization problem (39) by uoptvopt.
For positive secrecy rate, umax ≥ uopt > 1, vmax ≥ vopt > 0
and uoptvopt > 1. We obtain uoptvopt sequentially by in-
creasing u from 1 towards umax in discrete steps of size
△u = (umax − 1)/M , where M is a large positive integer,
and finding the maximum v such that the constraints in (40)
are feasible and the product uv is maximum. The algorithm
to obtain uoptvopt as follows.
1. for (i = 1 : 1 : M )
2. begin
3. ui = 1 + (i ∗ △u)
4. vi = max
Q0, Q1, Q2, v,
u=ui
v s.t. to all constraints in (40).
5. if (i = 1) then uopt = ui, vopt = vi
6. elseif (uoptvopt ≤ uivi) then uopt = ui, vopt = vi
7. else uopt = uopt, vopt = vopt
8. endif
9. end for loop
The constrained maximization problem in the for loop
can be solved using the bisection method by checking the
feasibility of the constraints in (40) at u = ui and v in the
interval [0, vmax]. Having obtained uoptvopt, the secrecy rate
is given by R
1
= log
2
uoptvopt.
We can take the rank-1 approximation of Q
1
and Q
0
as dis-
cussed in subsection III-B, i.e., by substitutingQ
0
= P0φ
0φ0∗
and Q
1
= P1φ
1φ1∗ in the optimization problem (39) and
solving for P0, P1, Q2, u and v.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We present the numerical results and discussions in this
section. We obtained the secrecy rate results through sim-
ulations for N = 2, K = 1 and J = 1, 2, 3 eavesdrop-
pers. The following complex channel gains are taken in the
simulations: h = [2.0824 − 1.7215i, 0.0788 − 0.0583i],
z1 = [−0.3989 − 0.0923i, −0.6770 + 0.3371i], z2 =
[0.0910 − 0.8258i, 0.6642 − 0.3257i], z3 = [−0.2784 −
1.3995i, −1.4867 + 0.9877i].
Figure 2(a) shows the secrecy rate plots for MISO broadcast
channel as a function of total transmit power (PT ) when no
artificial noise is injected. The secrecy rates are plotted for
the cases of with and without W0. For the case with W0, the
information rate of W0 is fixed at R0 = 1. From Fig. 2(a),
we observe that, for a given number of eavesdroppers, the
secrecy rate degrades when W0 is present. Also, the secrecy
rate degrades for increasing number of eavesdroppers. Figure
2(b) shows the R1 vs R0 tradeoff, where R1 is plotted as a
function of R0 for K = 1, J = 1, 2, 3 at a fixed total power of
PT = 9 dB and no artificial noise. It can be seen that as R0 is
increased, secrecy rate decreases. This is because the available
transmit power for W1 decreases as R0 is increased. The point
2.7 (approximately) on the R0 axis where the secrecy rate
drops to zero corresponds to Rmax
0
.
Figure 3(a) shows the secrecy rate plots for MISO broadcast
channel as a function of total transmit power (PT ) when
artificial noise is injected. Similarly, Fig. 3(b) shows the R1
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate in MISO broadcast channel for N = 2, K = 1,
J = 1, 2, 3, and no artificial noise. (a) secrecy rate vs total power (PT )
with/without W0, R0 = 1; (b) R1 vs R0 for PT = 9 dB.
0 3 6 9 12 150
2
4
6
8
PT (dB)
R
1
 
−
 
B
it
s
/
C
h
a
n
n
e
lU
s
e
 
 
Without W0, 1 Eave
Without W0, 2 Eaves
Without W0, 3 Eaves
With W0, 1 Eave
With W0, 2 Eaves
With W0, 3 Eaves
(a)
0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 30
1
2
3
4
5
6
R0 − Bits/ChannelUse
R
1
 
−
 
B
it
s
/
C
h
a
n
n
e
lU
s
e
 
 
1 Eave
2 Eaves
3 Eaves
(b)
Fig. 3. Secrecy rate in MISO broadcast channel for N = 2, K = 1,
J = 1, 2, 3, and with artificial noise. (a) secrecy rate vs total power (PT )
with/without W0, R0 = 1; (b) R1 vs R0 for PT = 9 dB.
vs R0 tradeoff with artificial noise, where R1 is plotted as a
function of R0 for K = 1, J = 1, 2, 3 at a fixed total power of
PT = 9 dB. We observe a significant improvement in secrecy
rate as compared to Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) when J = 2 or
3 eavesdroppers are present. When only one eavesdropper is
present, artificial noise does not help in improving the secrecy
rate. This is due to the null signal beamforming by the source
at the eavesdropper which is only possible when J < N .
Also, for the above channel conditions, we observe that the
solutions Q
0
and Q
1
obtained by solving the optimization
problems (19) and (39) have rank 1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated transmitter optimization problem in MISO
broadcast channel with common and secret messages. The
source operates under a total power constraint. It also injects
artificial noise to improve the secrecy rate. We obtained the
optimum covariance matrices associated with the common
message, secret message, and artificial noise, which maxi-
mized the achievable secrecy rate and simultaneously met the
fixed rate R0 for the common message.
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